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HOW A CONDITIONAL LIMITATION OPERATES. 
I. 
W HENEVER a freehold is limited to take effect upon a con-tingency which may happe~ before the regular expiration 
of the preceding estate of freehold, it takes effect in de-
feasance of such interest. The executory limitation thus operating 
cuts off the prior interest abruptly. By the "intrinsic force" of the 
executory limitation the preceding estate is terminated. The gift 
over operates to destroy, to divest,1 in defeasance of the prior gift. 
In the words of LORD LANGDALE, Master of the Rolls, in Jackson 
v. N obl.tP the preceding estate is "defeated by a contingent execu-
tory gift over." · 
There is hardly any rule of the law of real property more funda-
mental than the rule that at common law no future estate can take 
effect in defeasance of a preceding estate. Any future estate lim-
ited to take effect before the natural termination of the preceding 
estate, whether that estate be a particular estate or a remainder,3 
is necessarily in defeasance of that estate4 and therefore utterly 
void. It is of the utmost importance to emphasize this conception 
of the effect of a future estate to arise before the regular termina-
tion of the preceding estate. "The true point of distinction" . be-
tween remainders and such limitations over as are not remainders, 
says Fearne, is that "the former are limited to commence when the 
first estate is, by the very nature and extent of its original limitation, 
to expire or determine ; whereas the latter are limited so as to be 
independent of the measure or extent given to the first estate, and 
to take effect in possession, upon an event which may happen before 
the regular determination, to which the first estate is liable from the 
nature of its original limitation, and so as to rescind it."5 
'Harrison v. Foreman, 5 Ves. Jun. 2on Robinson v. Wood, 27 L. J. Ch. 726. 
• 2 Keen, 590. 
3 Cogan v. Cogan, Cro. Eliz. 360; Fearne, Cont. Rem. 263. 
• A reversion does not take effect in defeasance of a particular estate. "A reversion 
is where the residue of the estate always doth continue in him, that made the particular 
estate, or where the p:irticular estate is derived out of his estate." Co. Lit. 22 b. The 
only future interests that could be created by acts of parties at common law were re-
mainders. A remainder "is a residue of an estate in land depending upon a particular' 
estate, and created together with the same.'' Co. Lit. 49 a, 143 a. It depends upon the 
particular estate for support, consequently if the particular estate were cut short, de· 
feated, it too must fall. Statutory changes which have in some jurisdictions enabled 
grantees and assignees of reversions to take advantage of conditions have not altered 
the common law so far as persons entitled in remainder. are concerned. Challis, Real 
Prop. 3rd Ed. 81. 
• Fearne, Cont. Rem. 14; and see. the definition of an executory devise in Jarman, 
Wills, 6th Eng. Ed. 1432. 
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The common law judges might have taken the position that every 
future limitation operates upon the preceding freehold, when less 
than a fee, as the contingency named in a limitation, sei:ving to 
render it a determinable estate. But this they did not do.6 They 
held that a future limitation, if not limited to spring up after the 
termination of the particular estate, operated in defeasance of that 
estate,7 unless such estate, being less than a fee, was subject to reg-
ular termination only, whether upon one or more than one event, 
and the contingency upon which the future interest was to vest in 
possession could be construed as a limitation of the particular estate 
and not as a condition subsequent.8 If the first estate was a fee, no 
future estate could be limited on it, even though the contingency 
were one upon which such an estate of inheritance-had there been 
no gift over-might have been made to determine.9 
The common law stood so, and stands so today. The great change 
by which it became possible to limit a future estate in defeasance of 
a preceding estate was not brought about by any judicial undermin-
ing or repudiation. The common law principles were too funda-
mental and too well established for that.10 The change was made by 
statutes, and it is only by virtue of statutes acting directly or indi-
rectly upon these principles that such limitations are today cogniz-
able in courts of law. The new condition was achieved by what 
Blackstone calls "a sort of parliamentary magic." 
Perhaps no writer has expounded the operation of the executory 
limitation upon the preceding estate more forcefully than Williams.11 
The moment the contingency happens upon which the executory 
limitation becomes operative, "without any further thought or care 
• See the illustrations in Fearne, Cont. Rem. 261, 262. 
7 Digby, History of the Law of Real Property, 5th Ed., 264. 
•A particular estate which may determine upon the happening of a future event by 
virtue of a collateral limitation "is normally determined by the happening of that event; 
and a remainder may be as well limited over upon such a determinable estate, as upon 
the like estate when not determinable." Challis, Real Prop. 3rd Ed. 82. "So that if 
A was tenant for life, remainder to B in fee, on condition that A being a feme sole 
continues a widow; if A marries, the heir enters, and defeats the estate of A and of .1:1 
also; but if an estate had been granted to A durantc vid11itatc remainder to B and 
after A had married, the estate of A had determined by the limitation, and the remainder 
to B should be granted." Foye v. Hynde, 5 Vin. Ahr. 63, pl. 13. 
• "Therefore, if I limit an estate to the use of A and his heirs till C returns from 
Rome, and after the return of C to the use of B in fee; here the whole fee being first 
limited to the use of A, there is no remnant left to limit over; and consequently the 
limitation to B cannot be a remainder." Fearne, Cont. Rem. 12. But an estate to the 
use of A and his heirs till C returns from Rome--without any limitation over-is one 
of the most common illustrations of a determinable fee. See Challis, Real Prop. 3rd 
Ed., 257. 
'°Digby, Hist. Law R. P. sth Ed., 332. 
••Williams, Real Prop. 22d Ed. 383-385. 
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of the parties, the seisin or possession of the land" shifts to him 
to whom the gift over is made. The gift over "springs up" and 
"puts an end at once and forever to the estate" belonging to the pre-
ceding owner. "Here then "is the destruction of one estate and the 
substitution of another." His example is of a marriage settlement 
to the use of A and his heirs until the marriag~ of D and then to 
the use of D and his heirs. Upon the marriage of D, the seisin or 
possession of A is wrested from him by the use to D, instead of 
D's estate waiting until A's possession is over, as it must haye done 
had it been merely a remainder.12 
II 
When the future interest is a remainder it does not wrest the 
seisin or possession from the preceding tenant. Where one is in 
actual possession of an estate upon which estates in remainder or 
reversion are expectant, although he does not have the fee--which, 
according to the facts may be in the grantor or the remainder-man13 
-he is seised in his own right and in right of all the estates in re-
mainder and reversion under the same title.14 The remainder-men 
and reversioners are equally "in the seisin of the fee." They par-
ticipate in the actual seisin and possession in due order of succes-
sion ; because the livery to the particular tenant is intended and is 
effectual at once to transfer to or in behalf of the remainder-men 
what, upon the suggestion of Butler, may be called the expectant 
seisin and this becomes seisin in law (convertible into seisin in fact 
by entry) upon the regular terminatioll of the preceding i11terest.15 
"In such cas!'!," says Littleton, "the growing and ,being of the re-
12 The term seisin is still, in the words of James, L. J. in Leach v. Jay, 9 Ch. D. ~. 
( 1878), "one of the most technical words in our law. The word has acquired no other 
meaning than its technical meaning, it has never got into ordinary use." But see article 
by Sweet in I2 L. Q. R. 239, 247. The abolishment of livery of seisin has not materially 
reduced the importance of seisin. See, for example, Copestake v. Hoper ( I9o8), 2 Ch. 
JO, 18. 
13 Where the remainder is contingent the fee is in the granter until the remainder 
vests. See Gray, Perpetuities, Sec. II and citations. 
"Leake, Prop. in Land, 2d Ed., 32, 33. 
15 "When lands of inheritance are carved into different estates, the tenant of the 
freehold in possession, and the persons in remainder or reversion, are equally in the 
seisin of the fee. But in opposition to what may be termed the expectant nature ·of the 
seisin af those in remainder or reversion, the tenant in possession is said t 0 have the 
actual seisin of the lands. The fee is entrusted to him." Butler's note (I) Co. Lit. 
266 b. "To a grantee of a rev~rsionary estate it was impossible to make livery of 
seisin in the sense of giving physical possession, but on the death of the reversioner a 
heriot was due from him equally as on that of a P!!rson in possession, for the reversioner 
was e:qually in the seisin of the fee." Buckley, L. J. in Copestake v. Hoper (I908), 2 
Cb. IO, 18. This expression "in the seisin of the fee" seems to have become- a fixture. 
And see Cltallis, Real Prop. 3rd Ed., 99. 
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mainder is by the livery of seisin to him that shall have the free-
hold."10 
Although a remainder-man is "in the seisin of the fee," he is not 
"seised in fact" or "in law" in the ordinary meaning of those terms. 
Thus there can be no dower or curtesy of a remainder or reversion 
because there is neither seisin in fact nor in law of such estates.17 
Where A is tenant for life, B remainder-man in fee or rever-
sioner in fee and B dies in A's lifetime survived by a son who also 
dies in A's lifetime, the remainder or reversion descends at common 
law to the heir of B, the first purchaser. B's position in the seisin 
of the fee is sufficient to constitute him a stock of descent. But this 
is only because he is the first purchaser. Until the remainder, if 
ever during his lifetime, vests in possession, he is seised neither in 
fact nor in law. B's son is in a somewhat different case. Though 
the remainder descends to him, this descent will not ipso facto con-
stitute him a stock of descent. He is not the first purchaser, so a 
passive role would not suffice. If he did some act of ownership 
"equivalent in the eye of the law to obtaining actual ownership, 
had the estate been one of possession,''1s he then became the stock 
of descent, and if he died intestate, his estate descended at common 
law to his own heir and not to the heir of his father.19 That this 
act of ownership, though it is sometimes said that it gave him 
seisin in deed, was something different from complete seisin in deed, 
••Tenures 721: "The remainder * * * passeth out of the donor by the livery of 
seisin, * * * for the particular estate and the remainder, to many intents and purposes, 
make hut one estate in judgment of law.'' Co. Lit. 143 a. 
11 \Villiams, Seisin, 67, 68. "By [what is sometimes called] the seisin of such rever. 
sioner or remainder-ma!! is meant, in reality, no more than that such reversioner con-
tinues or such remainder-man is placed, in the tenancy, and that the property is fixed 
in him. The particular estates and the reversion or remainder over form, in law, but 
one estate; and, consequently, by delivering the possession to the person first taking it 
extends to all. All therefore, may he said to be seised, as they are all placed in the 
tenancy, and as the property is fixed in all." Watkins, Descents, 4th Ed. 36. As to dower 
and curtesy, see Durando v. Durando, 23 N. Y. 331; Ferguson v. Tweedy, 43 N. Y. 543, 
549; Stoddard v. Gibbs, 1 Sumn. 263, 270; Co. Lit., 29 a, b, 31 a, 32 a, b. See the inter-
esting argument, Duncumb v. Duncumb, 3 Lev. 437. A conveyance of the remainder, act 
of ownership though it be, does not give a seisin that will enable the widow to obtain 
dower. This has been held even when tenant for life and remainder-man joined in a 
conveyance in fee. Otis v. Parshley, 10 N. H. 403, 407. Nor does a conveyance in fee 
by the remainderman alone give such seisin though it may estop the grantee to deny the 
seisin of the grantor. Nason v. Allen, 6 Me. 243; Lewis v. Meserve, 61 Me. 374; 14 
Cyc. 981; I Scribner, Dower, 321·3:'4-
:ia "A tease of the remainder or reversion for life or in tail, or a conveyance of it 
in iee to another person, or to a trustee and his heirs in trust for himself and his heirs, 
were sufficient for this purpose.'' Williams, Seisin, 69. But it should be emphasized that 
such act did not give a technical seisin. See Watkins, Descents, 4th Ed., 40. 
19 Williams, Seisin, 69. "For the exertion of such acts of ownership is equivalent to 
the actual seisin of an estate which is capable of being reduced into possession by entry. 
For, as an actual entry is not practicable in the case of such reversion or remainder, the 
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in the technical and accustomed sense of that term, or from seisin 
in fact or in law seems manifest. 20 
The explanation of this requirement, as of seisin in fact where 
that was possible, was practical enough. It. was "to avoid further 
inquiry into the origin of the title."21 The same practical end would 
be subserved as readily in case of re!Dainders, by this act of owner-
ship "fixing the property," seisin being impossible. 
III. 
The operation of a conditional limitation in "wresting" the seisin 
and possession from the owner of the preceding estate and substi-
tuting for that estate another estate has on the one hand certain 
characteristics of a condition and on the other hand certain char-
acteristics of·a collateral limitation followed by a remainder. But it 
is neither. Its operation is distinctive. Courts and text writers 
have often referred to the contingency on which the gift over takes 
effect as a "condition"22 and not infr!'!quently they have described 
the prior gift and the gift over simply as "limitations," but usually 
in such cases they have employed these words in unwonted senses, 
or have been seeking to show in what respects the executory limi-
tation is like a common law condition or like a limitation recog-
nized at common law. 
If it is permissible to condense Fearne's thought we might say 
that he regards a conditional limitation as operating with the power 
and effect of a condition but in the manner of a limitation plus some-
alienation of them for a certain estate is sufficient to turn the descent; such grants being 
(before the Statutes 4 and 5 Anne, c. 16) always attended with atornment, the notoriety 
of them and the consequent alteration of the tenant, were deemed equal to the actual entry 
on a descent, or livery of seisin on a gift, or sale of an estate in possession; such attorn· 
ment being originally coram paribus, and in later days sufficiently attested [citationsJ. 
And for this reason, a reversion could not be granted over to take effect in futuro any 
more than an estate in possession." Watkins, Descents, 4th Ed., n6; Challis, Real 
Prop., 3rd Ed., 233. 
"' Thus Challis says that by such an act "a seisin in deed, sufficient to make the 
person obtaining it the root of descent, might be obtained." Real Prop., 3rd Ed., 233; 
Watkins seems to avoid this usage. See Op. cit. pp. 32, 52. Preston, Abstracts, II, 442, 
int treating of "Titles under Heirs" describes the seisin thus obtained as an actual seisin. 
But he does not say that it would give dower or curtesy. See article by Sweet in 12 
L. R. A. 239, 244·246; and note 17 above. Query as to significance of Watkins, De· 
scents, 4th Ed., 121 and citations. 
21 "The heir originally derived title from the terms of the grant, per formam doni, 
and must accordingly have trac<!d his descent from the original grantee or purchaser; but 
the adoption of the seisin as the root of descent was a maxim of convenience to avoid 
further inquiry into the origin of the title." Leake, Prop. in Land, 2d Ed., 43. 
"Thus in Blanchard v. Blanchard, I Allen- 223: "If * * * it can be regarded as a 
devise in fee to the five children, subject to be divested upon a condition subsequent, 
with a limitation over on the happening of that condition, • " * the limitation over 
would have taken effect only as an executory devise.'' 
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thing more. It operates in destruction of the preceding estate but 
it does this without the necessity of any formality. Thus, speaking 
of a conditional limitation in a will, 23 he says : "Wherever in a devise 
a condition is annexed to a preceding estate, and upon the breach 
or non-performance the estate is devised over, that condition shall 
operate as a limitation, circumscribing the continuance and opera-
tion of the first estate." This looks almost like collateral limitation. 
But in a moment the balance is redressed. For we are told that the 
conditional limitation enforces "the performance of the condition, 
by the determination of the preceding estate upon the breach of it." 
We are told that "upon the breach or performance of it (as the 
case may be) the first estate shall ipso facto determine and expire, 
without entry or claim."24 
This is as far as the analogy of the conditional limitation to the 
condition or the collateral limitation can be fairly extended. For 
the limitation over wrests the seisin or possession from the owner 
of the first estate without entry, claim or notice and substitutes an-
other estate; something that no common law limitation, direct or 
collateral, could do. Wherever the common law recognized a lim-
itation over expectant on the determination of an estate, it was al-
ways on the regular termination of that estate and never in defeas-
ance of it. This prime characteristic of the conditional limitation 
Fearne of course fully recognizes. The first estate having term-
inated "without entry or claim" by "the breach or performance" of 
the condition, he observes that "the limitation over shall thereupon 
actually commence in possession, and the person claiming under it, 
whether heir or stranger, shall have immediate right to the estate."25 
To grasp the meaning of the phrase that an executory limitation 
in defeating a preceding estate "substitutes" another, it is necessary 
to have in mind the conception of particular estate, remainder and 
reversion (if any) as constituting at common law but one estate 
for many purposes.26• The tenant of the particular _estate of free-
hold is "presumptively"27 seised of the whole of the fee simple. Or, 
in Butler's words "the fee is entrusted to him."28 When the re-
mainder-man or reversioner comes into possession it is of his part of 
the one estate-though of course his interest is often spoken of as 
a separate estate, and for ordinary purposes it would be thought 
23 But cf. his treatment of shifting uses, which is merely in effect a transcription 
from Brooke, Abr., Cont. Rem. 274. 
" Cont. Rem. 272. 
""Ibid. 
"" Co. Lit. 143 a. 
27 Leake, Prop. in Land, 2nd Ed., 32. 
""Butler's Note (1) on Co. Lit. 266b. 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
of as a separate estate.~9 But when a shifting use or an executory 
devise takes effect in defeasance of a preceding estate, an interest 
appears which cuts off the prior estate before its regular termina-
tion, as an entry on breach of condition w9uld, though the entry 
revests an old estate whereas the executory limitation emplaces a 
new one.30 No tenant of an estate s~bject to a condition subsequent 
is ever regarded as seised in right of the grantor and his heirs, who 
may enter on breach of the condition. When the grantor of an 
estate on condition enters he avoids the estate of the grantee-who 
by the feoffment, as Professor Gray puts it, had been substituted 
for himself as the lord's tenant-and places himself in the same 
relation to the lord which he had formerly held. The right to enter 
is "not_ a reversionary right coming into effect on the termination 
of an estate/' but is a "right to substitute the estate of the grantor 
for the estate of the grantee."31 
The similarity between this and an executory limitation in fee 
taking effect in defeasance of a fee is obvious. Estate yields to 
estate-in the one case a former estate, in the other a newly created 
one is established-and with this process comes a different tenant 
or owner. Yet, though it is not quite so apparent, when the execu-
tory limitation is less than a fee and acts in defeasance of an estate 
that is less than a fee, the effect in inaugurating a new estate line 
is the same. For example, if land is devised to B for life, but if B 
fails to pay C a stated sum then to C for life, and on C's death to 
D and his heirs, if the contingency happens, the interest to C takes 
effect in defeasance of B's life estate. It does not break down mere-
ly one of the parts of the estate line in which B is seised, allowing 
the rest to stand. It breaks down the whole and establishes another. 
C and D are not in the seisin of B ; B is not seised m behalf of C 
or D. The limitation to D is as much executory as is the limitation 
to C. It is not open to question that a limitation after an executory 
limitation cannot be regarded as other than executory. Just as soon 
as C's interest is in possession, however, D is in the seisin. He is 
in the seisin of C. He is then a true remainder-man.82 But he is 
a remainder-man in a new estate line, which had taken effect not 
as a part of the old estate line but on and by its destruction. 
,,. Thus the fee in the grantor or settler until a "contingent remainder vests is spoken 
of as a "vested estate." See Williams, Settlements, 208. 
30 Lit. Sec. 325. The distinction is stated very clearly in Watkins, Descents, 4th 
Ed., 210. 
31 Gray, Perpetuities, § 31. As to the process and effect of substitution, as distin· 
guished from subinfeudation, these being the two methods of alienation known to the 
feudal system, see Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, I, 330, 339. 
32 Fearne, Cont. Rem. 503, 504, 506; Gray, Perpetuities, 3rd Ed., § u4, note 4- Tif-
fany, Real Prop. 328. Crairg v. Stacey, Ir. Term Ridg. L. and S. 249; Storrs T. Burgess, 
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IV. 
The fundamental principles involved here easily shade into con-
fusion unless the differences between the seisin, the presumptive 
seisin of the fee and the actual ownership of the fee are always kept 
in mind. The actual ownership of the fee, together with the ques'-
tion of abeyance of the fee, may however, in some of their aspects, 
be regarded as quite distinct from the doctrine of seisin. It is true 
that the one who is seised represents the fee for various purposes ; 
he is presumptively seised of the fee; but he may be only a life 
tenant or tenant in tail. 
While in a limitation of a freehold particular estate followed by 
a contingent remainder in fee the tenant of the particular estate has 
the actual seisin, and is presumptively seised of the entire fee,33 
the fee, by the better and more modern view, is in the feoffor, the 
grantor, until the contingent remainder vests,34 which of course it 
29 R I. 269, 275. "When once an executory devise takes effect in possession, the Jim· 
itations depending on it change their nature and become either vested or contingent 
remainders," quoted in Craig v. Stacey, Ir. Term. Ridg. L. and S. 249; "Though the 
whole of a series of limitations, if subsequent to an executory limitation, must, in their 
inception, be executory limitations, yet, if the first executory limitation should after· 
wards become vested, then, if the subsequent limitations are such that they are i11ter se 
capable of being related as particular estate and remainder, they are usually styled by 
those names, and they possess the essential charcteristies of particular estate and re· 
mainder, although in their inception, since they would have been void at the common law, 
they were executory limitations." Challis, Real Prop., 3rd Ed., 124. 
33 The fee being owned by some one else the reference to the fee as "outstanding" 
seems, in such a case, most apt. See Egerton v. Massey, 3 C. B. N. S. 338. If the 
remainder in fee were vested, there would be, to adapt Fearne's words, a "passage for 
its transition, open at the time of the livery." Fearne, Cont. Rem. 361. There being no 
such passage of transition the inheritance is "outstanding" in the grantor • 
.. This is true even where there are contingent remainders with a double aspect, 
one of which must vest. \Villiams, Settlements, 207, 208; "When a conveyance is hy 
way of use or devise, there is, unquestionably, during the contingency of a remainder 
in fee a reversion in the grantor or devisor and his heirs, and the prevailing opinion 
seems to be the same way upon a feoffment at common law." Gray, Perpetuities, 3rd 
Ed., Sec. II, n. l; Greenleaf's Cruise, II, 336 note. "And though he [the particular 
tenant, to whom a life estate was devised] be the heir t<> whom the reversion descends, 
that shall not drown the estate for life contrary to the express devise and intent of the 
will, but shall leave an opening as they term it, for the interposing of the remainders 
when they shall happen to interpose between the estate for life and the fee; and they 
compared it to Archer's Case, I Co., where though Robert the devisee for life was heir, 
yet the remainder to his next heir male was contingent, and so not an estate for life 
merged by the descent of the reversion." Plunkett v. Holmes, I Lev. n; Purefoy v. 
Rogers, 2 \Vms. Saund. 380, 382 and note. "The question is, what becomes of the inter· 
mediate reversionary interest, from the time of the making of such future disposition 
until it takes effect? It was in the grantor or testator at the time of making such dis· 
position; it is confessedly not included in it. The natural conclusion seems to be that 
it remains where it was, vi:z: in the grantor or the testator and his heirs, for want of 
being departed with to anybody else. When the future disposition takes effect, then the 
reversionary or future interest passes pursuant to the terms of it; but if such future 
disposition failS of effect, either by reason of the determination of the particular estate, 
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may do before as well as immediately upon the termination of the 
particular estate. 
If A be given any freehold less than a fee, subject to a shifting 
use or executory devise to B and his heirs, A again has the actual 
seisin and the presumptive seisin of the entire fee, and the fee also 
in this case is in the grantor or his. heirs or the devisor's heir or 
residuary devisee.35 If the contingency occurs upon which B's estate 
vests, it of course defeats this fee and it does so only by wresting 
the seisin from A who is presumptively seised of the entire fee. 
The executory limitation is in derogation of the freehold estate; it 
incidentally defeats the fee which is in the grantee, heir or residuary 
devisee. If the limitation is of a particular estate subject to defeas-
ance b:v. an executory limitation less than a fee with no limitation 
of the fee itself,-for instance, a devise to testator's widow, A, for 
life, but if A remarries then to B for life, the executory limitation , 
upon the happening of the contingency may still be said to break 
down the entire estate line or presumptive fee of which A was 
seii-ed. There can be no doubt that B is now seised presumptively 
of the fee. For this is now simply a case of a life estate upon ·which 
a reversion is expectant. Yet B was never in the sei..,in of A; the 
srisin could shitt to him only upon the destruction 0f A's estate, 
not upon its regular termination. An'd the reversioner's interest is 
now expectant upon an entirely different estate and contingency. 
There is no doubt that the ownership of the fee is in the heir-at-law 
from the testator's death. But the estate line-the procession of 
orderly interests, each resting upon the preceding one for support-'-
is now entirely different; it is a new estate line.36 It must of course 
failure of the contingency or otherwise; what is there then to draw the estate, which 
was the intended subject of it, out of the grantor or his heirs, or the heirs of the 
testator? Or who can derive title to an estate, under a prospective disposition, which 
confessedly never takes any effect at all?" Fearne, Cont. Rem. 363. The contrary view 
respecting feoffment at common law, was founded on an ancient principle of law, "that 
every remainder must pass out of the grantor at the time of the livery." 2 Wm. Saund. 
382 note. "Where is the sense, in saying, a remainder must pass out of the grantor, 
in a case where you deny it ever passed at all to the grantee or anybody else? Or that 
livery must have its immediate operation, in a case where it is admitted to have left 
the estate in the same plight e.xactly as if it had never been made at all.'' Fearne, 
Cont. Rem. 363 and see 361; Williams, Real Prop., 22d Ed., 363; Bigley v. \Vatson, 
98 Tenn. 353, 370, 371; Pinkney v. Weaver, 216 Ill. 185, 193· 
"" "In conveyances which have their operation from the statute of uses, it was always 
a rule that the fee remains in the grantor and his heirs until the contingency happens." 
2 Wms. Saund. 382 a, note, speaking of remainders; Fearne, Cont. Rem. 351 et. seq. 
Greenleaf's Cruise, I, 371 et. seq. • 
oo Fearne, Cont. Rem. 353 et. seq; Plunkett v. Holmes, l Lev. II; Purefoy v. 
Rogers, 2 Wms. Saund. 380; Gray, Perpetuities, 3rd Ed., Sec. II, note. Hayes, in 
speaking of shifting uses, says :-''They take effect by defeating, to the extent of the 
ownership comprised in them, the fee previously vested in the takers under the other 
limitations, or (if those limitations would not exhaust the fee) partly in such takers, 
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be kept clearly in mind that what is meant throughout by a pre-
sumptive fee is a certain infinite interest, an uninterrupted estate 
line. The terms have been used synonymously. There cam1ot be 
two common law fees in the same land. And indeed so far as the 
feud, or fief - that fee in that sense - is concerned, no change is 
made in this respect by the Statute of Uses or the Statute of Wills. 
Since the Statute Quid Emptores the tenure of the must remain 
the same whatever happens to the estate line; but by a "substitution" 
at common law, or an executory limitation under the Statute of 
Uses or the Statute of Wills, one infinite estate line (still in the 
same feud, fief or fee) can be made to take the place of another. 
We may thus have a series of "turnings out and turnings in" of 
interests, estates, fees absolute or merely presumptive fees, of which 
the common law was not only incapable, but which it disliked and 
thought absurd. The words of one of the judges in Cogan v. Cogan 
strikingly reflect this feeling. Holding that a remainder must pass 
by the original livery and cannot be made to take effect on a con-
tingency defeating the particular estate, he said: "A remainder can-
not pass by a contingency ; for then there would be an absurdity 
follow, viz., there should by the first livery, be an immediate rever-
sion expectant upon the remainder for life; and afterwards this re-
mainder shall be turned out, and the reversion also ; and a new 
remainder and reversion shall come in place of them; so there should 
be turnings out and turnings in at several times, by one livery which 
was made at one time."37 Impossible at the common law, that is ex-
actly what the conditional limitation may do ·to-day. It may by 
virtue of the original seisin to uses, OF by the original testamentary 
conveyance, turn out a series of interests related as particular estate, 
remainder and reversion, and turn in a new series of interests which 
when they are turned in, if they are duly related inter se, become 
particular estate, remainder and reversion.-:is The process it may 
and partly (by way of resulting use) in A, the granter, or (if the resulting use be neg· 
atived) in B, the grantee, or (as the case may be) partly in such takers, and partly in 
A, the covenanter." An Elementary View, etc., 28. 
31 Cogan v. Cogan, I Cro. Eliz. 360. 
38 
"For example, a settler might limit lands to the· use of himself and his heirs until 
his marriage, and, after his marriage, to the use of himself for life, and after his death 
to the use of his sons successively in tail male, with divers remainders over. Here 
since the limitations commence with a fee, all the subsequent limitations must he execu· 
tory. Nevertheless if the marriage should in fact take place, nobody would scruple to 
say that the settler was then tenant for life, with remainder (contingent until the birth 
of a son) to his eldest son in tail male; and their respective estates would possess all 
the essential characteristics of an estate for life and contingent remainder. This usage 
is in accordance with the practice of the best authorities. For an example see 1'"earne, 
Cont. Rem. 459, where he speaks of 'a limitation after an executory devise in tail being 
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repeat again and yet again, always provided it keeps within the rule 
against perpetuities. 
And it may be observed, before this aspect of the matter is dis-
missed, that the effect upon the estate line, the "turning out" of one 
estate line and "tuming in" of another, is similar where the execu-
tory limitation is of the springing rather than the shifting kind. If 
land is devised to B for life and one year afterwards to C and his 
·heirs, B is actually seised and has the presumptive seisin of the . 
fee. The heirs of the devisor however, have the reversion and they 
are "in the seisin of the fee" until B dies.39 Thereupon they are 
seised, and they are seised of the freehold, indeed of the entire fee, 
at common law, which of course does not recognize the limitation 
to C. When the year has passed the seisin is wrested from them 
by the new estate line in the executory devise. And the effect would 
be the same in a conveyance to uses.40 
v. 
In the case of a shifting use given in Brooke41 there was a feoff-
ment to the use of W and his heirs until A should pay a sum of 
money and then to A and his heirs. The question was raised 
whether the estate could vest in A without an entry on the part of 
the feoffee to uses, and it was suggested that to resolve all doubt A 
should enter both in his own name and in the name of the feoffee. 
That would make him safe either way. The question of the neces-
sity of such entry long remained a mooted point.4z It gave rise to 
that chapter of ingenious and amusing theories concerning the seisin 
to future uses which is one of the most astonishing in the history 
so limited as to take effect, either in lieu of the preceding executory devise, if that 
failed, or else as a remainder upon it, if that took effect'.'' Challis, Real Prop., 3rd Ed., 
124 • 
.. The application of this phraseology to a devise seems warranted by the rule that 
whenever a devise cari take effect as a common- law limitation it shall do so. Purefoy 
v. Rogers, 2 Wms. Saund., 381; Re Ashforth (1905), l Ch. 535; Leake, Prop in Land, 
2d Ed., 262; Stephens v. Stephens, Cas. Talb. 228; Re Wrightson (1904), 2 Ch. 95. 
"° The use to C, changing the above illustrations to that e.'<tent, would be a spring· 
ing use. After B's life estate had terminated, the feoffor to uses would be seised of 
the fee, precisely as though he had made the conveyance to the use of C without the 
life estate to B. See Leake, Prop. in Land, 2d Ed., 256; Fearne, Cont. Rem. 390; Sir 
Edward Clere's Case, 6 Co. 17 a; Greenleaf's Cruise II, 326. · 
41 Mr. Shaw Fletcher in his essay on· "Contingent and Executory Interests in Land," 
published in 1915, gives cases of shifting uses occurring in or about the years 1393, 1398 
and 1417; pp. 107, 108, 225, 226, 227. Brooke, in the case above mentioned, which 
occurred seventeen years after the Statutes of Uses, says that a "use shall change from 
one to another by act e:e post facto, by circumstance, as well as it should before the said 
statute.'' Bro. N. C. pl. 423 • 
., Gray, Perpetuities, § 137, n. 4 and citations. 
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of real p_roperty. But the old aad conflicting ideas are now buried 
beneath a load of authority, statute and ridicule43 and it has long 
been admitted that no entry by or in the name of the feoffees is 
necessary.44 The seisin is shifted and the estate vested "without the 
thought or care" of the feoffee to uses or any cestui q11e use. The 
use and with it the seisin shifts by the happening of the contin-
gency. Even in cases where there was a conveyance to uses with-
out transmutation of the seisin-as in deeds of bargain and sale and 
covenants to stand seised-no entry was or is necessary. A bar-
gainee was constructively in possession under the statute without 
any actual entry.4 :; 
And now that the accepted principle is that the estates take effect 
"when and as they arise" without regard to the subsequent fate of 
the original seisin to uses,4c ~he question is no longer even academic. 
It is not necessary that the feoffee to uses be deemed to have possi-
bility of seisin, or scintilla jztris, so as to support the future uses. 
They will be executed without entry by him or anyone else. They 
operate in defeasance of the preceding estate "by circumstance" and 
the Statute of Uses simply confers the seisin upon the cestui,-
since the condition which would invoke the statute has been abso-
lutely satisfied by the original conveyance of a freehold to uses, 
present or future, vested or executory.47 
Still it must not be thought that this ultimate disposition of the 
matter assimilates the effect which a conditional limitation has on 
the seisin to that of a remainder or a reversion. At common law 
he who has a remainder or a reversion expectant on an estate of 
43 \Villiams, Real Prop., .22d Ed., 386; Digby, Hist. Law R. P., 5th Ed., 37I n.; 
Hayes, Real Estate, x66, described the doctrine of scintilla j11ris as an "invention to get 
rid of an assumi.ition"; Reeves, Real Prop., x206 • 
.. Gray, Perpetuities, § 137, n. 4; Leake, Prop. in Land, .2d Ed., 9I. 
••Challis, Real Prop., 3rd Ed., 4xo. 
•• Or as Leake says: "After much abstruse speculation concerning the nature of the 
statutory process, the result generally accepted seems to have been that it immediately 
converted uses of all admissible kinds into legal limitations in a manner quite beyond 
the power or control of the grantees to uses, and that the latter were merely formal 
instruments for carrying the legal title to the uses." Prop. in Land, .2nd Ed., 90. 
41 
"No scintilla whatever remains in the feoffees, but • * • upon a conveyance to 
uses, operating by transmutation of possession, immedi<Uely after the first estate is e::e-
rnted the releasees to uses are divested of the whole estate; the estates limited pre-
viously to the contingent uses take effect as legal estates, the contingent uses take effect 
as they arise by force of, and relation to, the seisin of the releasees under the deed. 
• * • This * * • would at once overthrow the fiction of scintilla j11ris, and with it the 
supposed necessity of an actual entry to revive contingent uses." Sugden, Powers, 8th 
Ed., I9. Sugden's view, as expressed here, after much urging by him, became incor-
porated in .23 and .24 Viet., c. 38, Sec. 7, the wording of which is that the estate of the 
cest11i que use is to take effect "by force of and by relation to the estate and seisin 
originally vested in the person seised to the uses." 
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freehold, obtains his seisin by virtue of the livery to the particular 
tenant. The seisin is delivered to the particular tenant in his be-
half. (Certain deeds today operate as, or take the place of, a 
feoffment in this respect.) But where land is conveyed to A and 
his heirs to the use of B and his heirs but if C returns from Rome 
then to the use of D and his heirs, the seisin which is in B by force 
of the Statute of Uses48 is a seisin of the entire fee. And therefore 
though D's interest upon the happening of the contingency also 
takes effect "by force of and by relation to the estate and seisin 
originally vested in the person seised to the uses,"49 it does so in 
absolute derogation of the preceding estate, wresting the seisin from 
B. To recall what Littleton indicated, a remainder "grows" on the 
particular estate. But an executory limitation uproots the estate 
upon which it operates, and plants itself in the place thereof. More-
, over a sometime remainder-man while seised in law is not seised 
in fact until he makes entry whereas a cestui que use if his interest 
is or has become a present interest may be seised in fact.50 "The 
Statute of Uses has always been considered to give a possession 
which for some purposes was to be treated as actual possession."51 
HAROLD M. BOWMAN. 
Boston University Law School. 
" "As be might have possession by force of a devise at common Jaw, so he shall 
have possession of the land here by force of the statute, and it is in cestui que use, 
before entry or agreement." Walmsley J. in Green v. Wiseman, Owen 86 (1600). See 
the argument by Joshua Williams, and the decision in Heelis v. Blain, 18 C. B. N. S., 90 • 
... See Note 47 • 
.. "And the seisin and possession thus transferred is not a seisin and possession 
in law only-not a mere title to enter upon the land, but an actual estate." Witham v. 
Brooner, 63 Ill. 344, quoting Cruise; Hutchins v. Heywood, 50 N. H. 491. Watkins, 
Descents, 4th Ed., zs n. Note (z). 
81 Bovill, C. J. in Hadfield's Case, L. R. 8 C P. 306, 31+ "The Statute of Uses," 
said Lord St. Leonards in Egerton v. Brownlow, 4 H. L. C. 1, zo6, "transferred uses, 
not into possessions, that is, made uses possessions." 
